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1 Introduction
Excessive credit growth periods are potential threats to the nancial stability. Credit booms
followed by recession periods may turn into nancial crises. In emerging market countries, due
to the interest rate gap between the local and major currencies, credit boom periods are often
accompanied by signicant foreign currency indebtedness, which then aggravates the crisis. This
was the case during the Latin American debt crises in 1980s, the Asian crisis in 1997-98 and the
2008 nancial crisis in Central and Eastern Europe.
The question is that through which channels does foreign currency lending aect risk? The
European Systematic Risk Board in one of its Macro-prudential Commentaries1 points out that
\Forex loans are associated with a variety of risks, starting with the increased probability of
credit booms, elevated credit and funding risks, impediments to monetary policy and enhanced
potential for cross-border spillovers". So which factors are in eect? And what part of risk is
independent of foreign currency lending.
In this paper I decompose the riskiness of foreign currency borrower rms by using a micro-
level data. The data allows me to dissect the eects inuencing the loan performance of foreign
currency borrowers. I assess to what extent is the excessive risk is owing to the boom-period
shift in risk taking (and thus over-indebtedness), to the heterogeneous eect of the crisis and
to the risk caused by the serious currency mismatch (which is then materialized by the huge
depreciation of the local currency during the crisis).
I analyze rms in Hungary during the 2008 nancial crisis. Hungary entered the crises
with more that half of the total private sector loans denominated in foreign currency. Mainly
two currencies - the Euro (EUR) and the Swiss franc (CHF) - were used for foreign currency
lending. During the crisis Euro borrowers perform much better than rms with Swiss franc loan.
In particular, the non-performing loan ratio for Swiss franc denominated loans in the corporate
sector have become more than twice as big as the non-performing loan ratio for Hungarian forint
(HUF) loans. Meanwhile, the loan performance of Euro and Hungarian forint borrowers have
changed quite similarly. I investigate the dierence between the performance of Euro and Swiss
franc borrowers.
Disaggregated data is essential to properly dissect the factors contributing to the riskiness of
borrowers. I use a unique dataset containing micro-level data on the universe of borrower rms
1Szpunar and G logowski (2012)
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in Hungary. It contains data on rms, banks and loan denomination.
I test three hypotheses to explain the gap between the performance of Euro and Swiss franc
borrowers. First, there could have been more unfavorable changes in the conditions of Swiss
franc loans. Indeed the Hungarian forint depreciated more to Swiss franc than to Euro and
thus the debt service on Swiss franc loans increased more than on Euro loans. I refer to this
hypothesis as the exchange rate eect.
Second, the crisis anyway may have hit harder the Swiss franc borrowers. This can be the
case for example if rms belonging to sectors that were aected the most by the economic
downturn had been more prone to borrow in Swiss franc. I call this hypothesis the crisis balance
sheet eect.
Third, per se riskier rms may have got Swiss franc loan. One potential explanation for this
is that the strong competition in the banking sector could lead to a shift in the credit supply
and this excess credit might have concentrated at Swiss franc lending. I refer to this potential
explanation as the ex-ante credit risk hypothesis.
I disentangle the aforementioned hypotheses in three steps. In each step I calculate counter-
factual excessive default probabilities of foreign currency borrowers (separately for Swiss franc
and Euro) to Forint borrowers, that is how much extra risk would foreign currency borrowers
represent compared to local currency debtors in some hypothetical case.
In the rst step I calculate default probabilities that would be without the crisis. Thus I can
capture the part of the excessive risk which is due to the (observed part of) ex-ante credit risk.
First, I estimate a default probability model on pre-crisis data using all rms with outstanding
debt. Then, I project the model to the crisis years and I compare the predicted default ratios
of Swiss franc and Euro borrowers to rms with Hungarian forint credit. I nd that Swiss franc
borrowers were ex-ante riskier then Euro or Forint borrowers.
In the second step I calculate the default probabilities of foreign currency borrowers that
would be if they were Hungarian forint borrowers. I use a propensity score matching method
where treatment is dened as having foreign currency loan and the propensity score is estimated
on rms' pre-crisis characteristics. In this way I compare the crisis default probabilities of rms
with foreign and with local currency credit but otherwise same pre-crisis observed characteris-
tics. The dierence between their crisis performance would capture the exchange rate eect in
case of unconfoundedness, however there are unobservables aecting both currency choice and
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riskiness2. Thus in fact the dierences capture both the exchange rate eect and the unobserved
part of ex-ante credit risk. The result show that among rms with apparently same pre-crisis
characteristics but dierent loan denomination the one with Swiss franc became the most risky
and the one with Hungarian forint become the less risky.
In the third step I calculate the default probabilities of foreign currency borrowers that
would be if they borrowed in the local currency. I isolate the exchange rate eect from the
unobserved factors by applying an instrumental variable approach. I instrument foreign currency
indebtedness of the the rm with their bank relationships. The instrument is motivated by the
observation that banks had eect on rms' currency denomination choice. Thought currency
lending also inuenced the matching between banks and rms, thus instruments building on
current bank-rm relationships would be invalid. Thus instead I use only bank-rm relationships
established before the foreign currency lending boom. I nd that the exchange rate changes had
signicant eect on the riskiness of Swiss franc borrowers but not on Euro debtors.
Literature [to be explicated] This paper is related to the literature which analyzes credit
cycles and systematic risk. Aggregate studies show that episodes of excessive credit growth are
good predictors of nancial crises (Mendoza and Terrones (2012), Schularick and Taylor (2012)).
Though there are both good and bad credit booms. In the former case the credit expansion
is driven by a productivity-driven shift in the demand for the credit (for instance a positive
technology shock). Thus the boom is caused by economic fundamental and the subsequent
crisis is attributed to bad luck. In the latter case credit expansion is caused by a shift in the
supply of credit driven by imperfections in the credit supply process. In order to properly
disentangle the demand and the supply side one needs disaggregated data. For example Mian
and Su in a series of articles3 analyze with microeconomic data the mortgage credit expansion
and the subsequent recession in the US. They nd that a shift in the supply of credit combined
with the accelerator eect of borrowing against increasing house values caused the huge growth
in the leverage of US households between 2002 and 2006. Then the consequent reduction in
aggregate demand drove Great Recession.
My paper also belongs to the literature on foreign currency lending4. Most of the papers use
2See for example Beckmann and Stix (2015) who show relationship between nancial literacy and the demand
for foreign currency loans
3Mian and Su (2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2011) and Mian et al. (2010)
4For a detailed review of the related literature see Nagy et al. (2011).
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aggregate data (Basso et al. (2011), Luca and Petrova (2008)). There are also a growing number
of studies using rm or loan level data. Some of them are based on survey data (Beer et al.
(2010), Bodnar (2009)); while others match loan contract data to some observable individual
characteristics. My work belongs to the latter stream. In this stream the early papers - because
of data availability - are usually based on large, listed companies (Allayannis et al. (2003)).
There are only few papers covering the SME sector as well. One is Brown et al. (2014) who uses
detailed loan data of one Bulgarian bank. The other is Endresz et al. (2012) who analysis rms
with currency mismatches in Hungary.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I present stylized facts about
foreign currency lending in general and in Hungary. Section 3 describes the data and the sample.
In Section 4 I preform the analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Stylized facts
In the lead up to the 2008 nancial crisis many European transition countries experienced credit
boom accompanied by high foreign currency lending shares. Figure 1 shows the share of foreign
currency loans from nancial institutions to the non-bank sector in some European countries in
2007.
In most of the concerned countries the high foreign currency loan shares have deepened the
serious economic downturn following the 2008 nancial crisis 5. The phenomenon is not new,
previously we have seen similar situations in many other emerging countries. Famous examples
are the Latin American debt crises in the 1980s, the Mexican nancial crisis in 1994-1995 and
the Asian nancial crises in 1997-1998.
Hungary is also among the countries where a signicant proportion of companies raise debt
in foreign currency. Figure 2 presents the currency decomposition of new corporate loans in
Hungary from 2005 to 2011. It shows that the two leading foreign currencies are the Euro and
the Swiss franc. Bank credit denominated in Euro represent the same magnitude during the
observed period. In contrast Swiss franc lending after peaking in 2008Q1, collapsed in 2009.
What factors contributed to the popularity of Euro and Swiss franc denominations? Figure 3
5For example Beck et al. (2013) study the determinants of non-performing loans in 75 countries around the
2007-2008 crisis and nd that the extent of foreign exchange lending is an important factor in explaining loan
performance.
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Figure 1: Share of foreign currency loans in some European countries in 2007
Note: Source: Brown, Peter and Wehrmuller (2009)
Figure 2: Currency decomposition of new corporate loans in Hungary
Note: The gure presents quarterly data between 2005 and 2011 on the amount of new loans (measured in million
HUF) issued by banks in Hungary broken down by currency denomination.
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shows the changes in exchange rate changes compared to 2005Q1 and the three-month Hungarian
forint, Euro and Swiss franc money market interest rate levels. Euro and Swiss franc interest
rates are lower then the Hungarian forint interest rate. Moreover Euro looks a natural choice
in countries willing to join the euro-zone. But what about Swiss franc? Swiss franc lending has
its roots in areas of Austria close to the Swiss border6. First the Swiss franc lending practice
dispersed over Austria, then multinational banks transmitted across the borders what local banks
quickly adopted. Figure 3 shows that Swiss franc and Euro interest rates moved quite similar
during the period, however the level of Swiss franc interest rate was always lower. Besides,
the EUR/HUF and the CHF/HUF exchange rate also changed quite similar until the end of
2009. The low interest rate together with the small EUR/CHF volatility made Swiss franc loans
attractive. However, later on the Hungarian forint depreciated more relative to Swiss franc than
to Euro. This partially explains the post-2008 trends in foreign currency lending.
Figure 3: Exchange rates and interest rates
Note: The gure shows quarterly changes in CHF/HUF and EUR/HUF exchange rates compared to 2005Q1 (mea-
sured on the left-hand side axis)and 3-month money market HUF, CHF and EUR interest rate levels (measured
on the right-hand side axis).
Meanwhile, the riskiness of Euro and Swiss franc borrowers changed quite dierently. Fig-
ure 4 shows the non-performing loan ratios for loans denominated in dierent currencies between
6Beer Ongena and Peer (2010), Epstein and Tzanninis (2005), Waschiczek (2002))
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2007 and 2011. All of them show an increasing pattern, however the non-performing loan ra-
tio for Swiss franc borrowers rose much steeper than the for the other currencies. Euro loans
changed quite similar to the performance of Hungarian forint denominated loans and at the end
of the period even outperformed it.
Figure 4: Ratio of non-performing corporate loans by currency in Hungary
Note: The gure shows quarterly data between 2007 and 2011 on non-performing loan ratios (the share of number
of loans with more than 90-day delinquencies in total loan portfolio) of banks in Hungary.
3 Data
3.1 Data sources
I use several data sources to compile my database. The rst one is the database of the Hungarian
National Tax and Customs Administration (NTCA) containing the nancial report (balance
sheet and income statement) of all Hungarian companies with double-entry bookkeeping7. Then,
data on loans is available from the Hungarian credit registry, called Central Credit Information
System (CCIS). It contains contract level data on all outstanding credit loans in the Hungarian
banking sector. Basic data about the loan such as the type of agreement, outstanding amount
7According to the Hungarian accounting rules, businesses above a certain threshold have to use double-entry
bookkeeping.
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and currency denomination are available for all loans extended between 2005 and 2011. Data
on late payments are available from 2007. Both CCIS and NTCA contain the tax number of the
rms through which I match the two databases. However CCIS does not contain the identity
of the lender. Instead, I exploit the rm-bank relationships available from the Complex rm
register database. This database contains the bank account numbers of each company from
which I can identify the banks in relationship with each rm in any time period8. Finally, I
complete my database with bank variables available from bank regulatory reports. Figure 5 in
the Appendix sums up how data is compiled.
3.2 Sample
My sample includes non-nancial corporations with bank loan of which I have data on bank
relationship and rm characteristics between 20049 and 2008. I exclude rms borrowing in
foreign currency other than Euro or Swiss franc10 in order to avoid capturing the eect of
other foreign currencies. Table 1 shows the composition of borrowers broken down by currency
denomination of their credit.
Table 1: Composition of borrowers broken down by currency denomination of their loan
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Excluded
year HUF EUR EUR,HUF CHF CHF,HUF CHF,EUR
CHF,EUR,
HUF
Total
2004 35 260 2 243 3 020 1 713 2 473 100 330 45 139
2005 37 112 2 336 3 214 2 665 3 583 114 456 49 480
2006 38 664 2 321 3 179 3 732 4 912 151 521 53 480
2007 39 929 2 449 3 345 4 441 5 615 208 811 56 798
2008 37 651 2 736 3 406 4 163 3 998 374 863 53 191
Total 188 616 12 085 16 164 16 714 20 581 947 2 981 258 088
Source: Central Credit Information System
Only a minority of the rms have both Euro and Swiss franc (1-2% in each year), thus I
8The rst three digits of the bank account number is the GIRO code. The GIRO code is initially a unique
identier for each bank. However in case of mergers and acquisitions the successor institution inherits the GIRO
code, thus a bank might have more GIRO codes and a GIRO code might belong to dierent banks in dierent
times. The Verication Table issued monthly by the Central Bank of Hungary contains the actual GIRO code-
bank matches. Using the historical versions of the Verication Table I track the GIRO code-bank matches through
time and thus identify in each period the bank associated with a bank account number.
9loan data is only available from 2005, since in the other case I use year-end data, for 2004 I can use instead
beginning of 2005 data
10Only 0.6% of all borrower rms have loan denominated in other foreign currency. Results are robust to their
inclusion.
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exclude them from the estimation11.
The nal sample consists of 258 088 rm-year observations covering 74 495 individual rms
and 37 banks12. The focal group of my analysis is rms with loan at the end of 2008. There are
53 191 rms and 32 banks in this subsample.
I categorize the borrowing rms into three groups according to the denomination of their
loans. Firms with only Hungarian forint loans belong to the rst group. The second group
contains rms with any Swiss franc loan, that is those rms who have only Swiss franc loans
or have both Swiss franc and Hungarian forint loans. The third category consists of Euro
borrowers, that is rms with only Euro or with both Euro and Hungarian forint loans. I
refer to the three groups as Hungarian forint, Swiss franc and Euro borrowers, respectively. I
denote by (it) 2 J or yit = J if rm i in year t belongs to the J currency borrower group,
where J 2 fHUF;EUR;CHFg. Table 2 shows the summary statistics of borrowers in 2008 by
currency group13.
Table 2: Summary statistics
Group 1 (HUF) Group 2 (CHF) Group 3 (EUR)
Variable Mean Std. Median Mean Std. Median Mean Std. Median
Export sales ratios 0.04 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.32 0.00
Foreign ownership 0.05 0.23 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.27 0.44 0.00
Capital ratio 0.40 0.29 0.37 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.32 0.25 0.29
Liquidity ratio 0.63 0.30 0.69 0.50 0.30 0.49 0.49 0.30 0.48
Log total assets 10.53 1.91 10.48 11.19 1.65 11.20 12.70 1.69 12.83
ROA -0.04 0.69 0.02 -0.02 0.41 0.02 -0.01 0.47 0.01
Log num.of employees 1.52 1.25 1.39 1.69 1.24 1.61 2.54 1.58 2.64
Log age 2.02 0.60 2.08 2.05 0.58 2.08 2.22 0.59 2.40
Switcher 1.32 0.60 1.00 1.36 0.58 1.00 1.84 0.91 2.00
Number of banks 1.64 0.89 1.00 1.85 0.99 2.00 2.03 1.22 2.00
Firms with Euro loan export more on average, are owned by foreigners with higher prob-
ability, bigger then their peers both in terms of total assets and number of employees, more
11Neither duplicating the observations then assigning them both to the group of Euro borrowers and to the
group of Swiss franc borrowers, nor randomly assigning them to either the Euro or the Swiss franc borrowers alter
my ndings.
12I use the label bank both for commercial banks and branch oces of foreign banks. Although these two
groups have dierent legal status, they operate alike in terms of lending. Note, however, that my sample does
not cover saving cooperatives since they dier in many relevant aspects. Saving cooperatives are typically rural
institutions with special clientele and more limited range of services. They give only 3-4% of corporate lending
and less than 1% of foreign currency corporate lending.
13The denitions on the variables are found in Table 7 in the Appendix
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protable, elder, less liquid and has more bank relationships than the their peers. Swiss franc
borrowers export less, are owned by foreigner with smaller probability and less capitalized then
other rms. Hungarian forint borrowers are more capitalized, more liquid, less protable, smaller
younger and has less bank relationships then their peers.
So my focus group is the rms with loan in 200814. In particular, I analyze how riskiness
of these rms changes during the succeeding 3 years. My indicator of risk is the default on
bank loans. A rm is dened to be in default if it has loan with more than 90-day delinquency.
I concentrate on cumulative defaults, in particular the s-year default at year t for rm i is
denoted by the dummy variable defi;t;s, which is equal to one if rm i defaults during the
subsequent s years (i.e. in years [t+ 1; t+ s]) and equals zero otherwise. The s-year default
ratio (or non-performing loan ratio) at year t is the ratio of rms who are defaulted within
s-year: deft;s 
P
i Pr(defi;t;s)
Nt
, where Nt denotes the total number of rms in year t. Similarly
the s-year default ratio for the J currency group at year t is defJt;s 
P
i;t2J Pr(defi;t;s)
NJt
, where NJt
stands for the number of rms belonging to group J in year t. Table 3 shows for each currency
group the s-year default ratios for 2008 borrowers.
Table 3: The s-year default ratios of 2008 borrowers
HUF CHF EUR
1-year 4.49% 9.16% 5.90%
2-year 7.22% 13.73% 9.09%
3-year 9.39% 17.02% 11.06%
Source: Central Credit Information System
4 Empirical strategy
I proceed in three steps. In each step I calculate excessive default probabilities of foreign currency
borrowers (separately for Swiss franc and Euro) to Forint borrowers based on some counterfactual
default probabilities. In the rst step I calculate the excess default probabilities that would be if
there were no crisis. In the second step I model what would be if the foreign currency borrowers
were local currency borrowers. Then in the third step I estimate the default probabilities that
would be if foreign currency debtors would instead borrow in Hungarian forint.
14I choose 2008 since in Hungary the crisis started to escalate in fall of 2008, thus the eects mainly appeared
from 2009.
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4.1 Ex-ante riskiness
In this section I estimate the ex-ante riskiness of rms indebted in dierent currencies. The
estimates are ex-ante in the sense that they show what would be without the outbreak of the
crisis. I estimate a pre-crisis default model which then I project to crisis years. I compare the
ex-ante default probabilities across group of borrowers with dierent currency denomination.
Consider a general specication for the probability of default over [t; t + s] which looks as
follows:
defi;t;s = sFi;t + t;s + i;t;s (1)
where defi;t;s is a dummy for default event over [t; t+ s], which takes value one if rm i defaults
from year t+1 to year t+ s, equals zero otherwise. Fi;t is a set of rm-specic variables for rm
i at the end of year t (in particular sector dummies, rm export sales ratio, foreign ownership,
size, capital ratio, liquidity, protability, age, indicator for new bank relationship) and t;s is
time xed eect representing average macro eects for the period.
I use only pre-crisis data (that is 8t : t + s  200815) to estimate the model. Thus the
parameter vector s represents the averages pre-crisis coecients.
The estimated coecients are shown in Table 8 in the Appendix. Exporters are less likely
to default in one and two years. Foreign owned, more capitalized and more protable rms are
less risky in all time horizon. Surprisingly liquidity does not matter in short run, though in
long run more liquid rms are riskier. Firms bigger in terms of balance sheet are more likely to
default, while rms with more number of employee are less risky. New clients are riskier in all
time horizon. Older rms are less risky in two and three-year horizon.
Fitting the model to 2008 rm characteristics I can estimate the default probabilities that
would have been if there were no crisis. That is the no-crisis counterfactual default probability
for rm i is
ddef i;2008;s = bsFi;2008 + b2008;s (2)
15In particular I use t 2 [minf2005; 2007  sg; 2008  s]. On the one hand the crisis gives the upper limit. Thus
default data from 2008 is the latest year which I can use. For s-year prediction it means the (2008-s)-year balance
sheet data. On the other hand data is available on loans from 2005, on default from 2007. The lower limit is thus
minf2005; 2007  sg.
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Similarly for the J 2 fHUF;EUR;CHFg currency borrower group the counterfactual de-
fault probabilities can be calculated as follows:
ddefJ2008;s = bsF J2008 + b2008;s (3)
where F Jt represents average characteristics of rms belonging to the J currency borrower group
(F Jt 
P
it2J (Fit)
NJt
).
The problem is that the year xed eects for 2008 (b2008;s) are unknown. Fortunately we
still can calculate the excess default probabilities of foreign currency over Forint borrowers:
dEdefJ;HUF2008;s ddefJ2008;s  ddefHUF2008;s = bs(F J2008   FHUF2008 ) (4)
Table 4 shows the estimated excess default probabilities. These captures the (observed part
of) ex-ante credit risk. The results show that companies indebted in Swiss franc are ex-ante
riskier on average than their peers on all analyzed time horizons.
Table 4: Step 1 estimated excess default probabilities
CHF EUR
1-year default probability 0.59pp 0.15pp
2-year default probability 0.41pp 0.04pp
3-year default probability 0.18pp 0.17pp
The table reports predicted excess default
probabilities that would be if there were no
crisis.
4.2 Propensity Score Matching
In this section I compare foreign currency borrowers to Hungarian forint borrowers with similar
pre-crisis characteristics. Thus I can get the default probabilities of foreign currency borrowers
that would be if they were forint borrowers.
I apply a propensity score matching approach. I perform the analysis separately for Swiss
franc borrowers and for Euro borrowers. In both case the treated group is the group of rms
with loan denominated in the given foreign currency in 2008, while the control group is rms
with only Hungarian forint loan in 2008. First, I estimate the probability to be treated (the
propensity score) based on the rms' 2008 characteristics:
12
eJ(Fi;2008)  Pr(yi;2008 = J jFi;2008 ) = Fi;2008 + i;2008 (5)
where yi;2008 is the denomination of the loan of rm i in 2008 such that J 2 fEUR;CHFg
and Fi;2008 are rm specic variable for rm i at the end of 2008 (in particular sector dummies,
rm export sales ratio, foreign ownership, size, capital ratio, liquidity, protability, age, indicator
for new bank relationship).
Then, by comparing the default probabilities of local and foreign currency borrowers with
the same propensity score I get the so called treatment eects. In particular, I calculate the
average treatment eects for the treated:
ATET = E(defJi;2008;s   defHUFi;2008;s jyi;2008 = J ) (6)
where defJi;2008;s is the s-year default in 2008 of rm i who belongs to the J currency borrower
group (yi;2008 = J) and def
HUF
i;2008;s is the default for a rm with the same propensity score as
rm i but with Hungarian forint loan.
The average treatment eects on treated are in fact the access counterfactual default prob-
abilities. In case of unconfoundedness it would captures the exchange rate eect. But there are
unobservables aecting both currency choice and riskiness (for example rms with nancially
less qualied management are expected to borrow moreSee for example Beckmann and Stix
(2015). in FX and also to be per se riskier). Thus these treatment eects incorporate both the
exchange rate eect and the unobserved part of ex-ante credit risk. Table 5 shows the results.
Table 5: Step 2 ATET
CHF EUR
1-year default probability 3.81pp 1.33pp
2-year default probability 5.34pp 2.43pp
3-year default probability 6.34pp 2.58pp
The table reports predicted excess default
probabilities that would be if foreign cur-
rency borrowers were forint borrowers.
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4.3 Exchange rate eect
In this section I analyze the eect of the change in the exchange rate on the credit risk of foreign
currency borrowers. I estimate what would be the default probability of rms with foreign
currency credit they borrowed instead in the local currency.
I estimate the following model:
defi;2008;s = sFi;2008 + 
CHF
s firmCHFi;2008 + 
EUR
s firmEURi;2008 + i;2008;s (7)
where defi;2008;s is a dummy for default event over [2008; 2008 + s]. Fi;2008 is a set of rm
variables for rm i at the end of year 2008 (in particular rm sector dummies, export sales
ratio, foreign ownership, size, capital ratio, liquidity, protability, age, indicator for new bank
relationship). Then firmCHFi;2008 and firmEURi;2008 are dummies denoting if the rm i has
loan denominated in Swiss franc borrower or in Euro borrower, respectively. After estimating
the model the counterfactal default probabilities of foreign currency borrowers that would be
if they borrowed in Forint (that is when firmCHFi;2008 = 0 and firmEURi;2008 = 0) can be
calculated as follows:
ddef i;2008;s = bsFi;2008 (8)
However, as I have already pointed out earlier, there are unobserved factors aecting both
the riskiness of rms and their currency choice. Thus I apply an instrumental variable approach
to address this endogeneity problem. In particular, I instrument the currency borrower dummies
(firmCHFi;2008 and firmEURi;2008) with bank xed eects. The motivation of the instrument
is based on the observation that the currency denomination of loans are aected by the supply
side as shown in Subsection 4.3.2. However, currency lending also aects the bank-rm matching
process as shown in Subsection 4.3.1. Because of that, instrument building on the current bank-
rm relationships might be correlated to the unobserved factors aecting the denomination
preference of rms. Hence, I restrict the sample to rms who already have been with their
banks before the foreign currency lending boom, in particular I include only rms that have
not established new bank relationships since 2004. In the following two subsections I motivate
the choice of the instruments. First, I demonstrate that bank-rm matching are inuenced by
foreign currency lending. Second, I show evidence that the currency choice of rms are also
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aected by the banks. Finally, I present the result of the IV estimation.
4.3.1 Bank-rm relationship
In this subsection I investigate whether foreign currency lending had eected on the bank-
aliation of rms. If rms go to banks where they can borrower easier in foreign currency then
we should see that those who would like to borrow foreign currency changes bank with higher
probability and thus the currency demand of new and old clients should be dierent. However
banks handle new clients dierently (e.g. due to information asymmetry) which would confound
the comparison of new and old clients. Thus, instead I compare voluntarily and involuntarily
new clients of a foreign currency lender bank.
I study a bank acquisition taken place at the end of 2007. In 2007 the acquirer bank lent more
both in Swiss franc and in Euro (16.3% and 36.7% of its extended credit was denominated in
Swiss franc and in Euro, respectively) then an average bank (10.6% Swiss franc and 29.8% Euro
share) or the acquired bank (5.1% Swiss franc and 30.4% Euro share). This suggests easier access
to foreign currency for the clients of the acquirer bank. I analyze the currency choice16 of the
clients of the acquirer bank in 2008, the year right after the acquisition. I dierentiate old clients,
voluntarily new clients and involuntarily new clients. I apply a multinominal logit estimator to
model their denomination choice. The potential outcomes are the three denomination based
categories, that is J 2 fHUF;EUR;CHFg. The probability that rm i borrows in currency
structure J is given by the following multinominal logit regression:
Pr(yi = J) =
exp(J1SelfNewcomeri + 
J
2Acquiredi + 
JFi)P
K2fHUF;EUR;CHFg exp(
K
1 SelfNewcomeri + 
K
2 Acquiredi + 
KFi)
(9)
where yi is the currency group where rm i belongs to based on the currency structure of its
2008-year new loans. The SelfNewcomer dummy indicates voluntarily new clients, that is
companies deciding to go to the bank of their own accord in 2008. While the Acquired dummy
represents the clients inherited from the acquired bank, that is to say involuntarily new clients.
Fi is a set of rms characteristics corresponding to rm i at the end of 2007, in particular rm
sector dummies, export sales ratio, foreign ownership, size, capital ratio, liquidity, protability
16I separate the choice of borrowing from the chice of currency denomination. Therefore I concentrate companies
taking loan in 2008 and thus exclude from the sample rms not borrowing in that year.
15
and age.
Table 9 in the Appendix presents the results. I report marginal eects of each covariate
evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables. The marginal eects show the change in the
probability of observing a given outcome resulted from a small change in a covariate (a change
from 0 to 1 for dummy variables), holding all other explanatory variables constant, in this case
at their mean. Self-newcomers compared to old clients borrow in Swiss franc with higher relative
probability, while acquired clients are not borrowing signicantly more in Swiss franc. That is
rms are choosing to go to the bank especially to borrow in Swiss franc. This shows that the
bank-rm matching is in fact aected by foreign currency lending.
4.3.2 Supply eect
In this subsection I test whether the lending practice of the banks inuence the denomination
choice of their client. I compare two anyway identical rms who are related to dierent banks.
I show that the currency lending practice of the aliated bank predict the currency choice of
the rm.
I apply a multinominal logit estimator to model the possible denomination outcomes. The po-
tential outcomes are the three denomination based categories, that is J 2 fHUF;EUR;CHFg.
The probability that the currency structure of the outstanding loans of rm i in year t falls into
category J is given by the multinominal logit regression as follows:
Pr(yi;t = J) =
exp(JCHF bankCHFi;t 1 + 
J
EURbankEURi;t 1 + 
JFi;t 1)P
K2fHUF;EUR;CHFg exp(
K
CHF bankCHFi;t 1 + 
K
EURbankEURi;t 1 + KFi;t 1)
(10)
where yi;t is the currency group where rm i belongs to in year t based on the currency structure
of its outstanding loans. The bankCHFi;t and the bankEURi;t variables are the share of Swiss
franc and the share of Euro in the credit portfolio of the bank of rm i in year t17. Then Fi;t
include a set of rms characteristics corresponding to rm i at the end of year t, in particular,
I include the following rm specic variables18: sector dummies, rm export sales ratio, foreign
ownership, size, capital ratio, liquidity, protability and age. I also include year xed eects.
17If a rm has multiple bank relationships than I use the average characteristic of the related banks.
18Denitions of the variables are found in Table 7 in the Appendix
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If bank-rm relationships were exogenous then the coecient of bankCHF and bankEUR
would purely capture supply side eects. However Subsection 4.3.1 showed that foreign currency
lending aect the evolution of bank-rm relationships. A company who is more willing to lend
in foreign currency is more willing to choose a bank who lends more in foreign currency. If there
are unobserved factors aecting both the currency and the bank choice of rms, the parameter
estimates will be biased. In order to get around this problem, instead of the current relationships,
I use the bank-rm connections established not later than 200319. The variables are thus the
share of currency in the credit portfolio of the bank that had already been related to the rm
before 2003.
Table 10 in the Appendix presents the results. I report marginal eect evaluated at the
mean of the explanatory variables. Higher share of a foreign currency in the credit portfolio of
a bank makes the client of the bank more likely to borrow in that currency. This suggests a
supply side push of foreign currency loans, hence the currency choice decomposition of banks
dier not only because banks have dierent clientele but also because banks provide foreign
currency denominated loans with dierent intensity. Interesting observation is that when a rm
is related to a bank which is lending more in Swiss franc, then the rm borrows in Euro with
huigher probability, while the reverse is not true.
4.3.3 Results
Table 6 reports the estimated eects from the IV estimations, while 11 in the Appendix shows
the coecients from both the OLS and IV estimations.
Estimated exchange rate eects: bCHFs and bEURs
The results show that the eects of the exchange rate are large for Swiss franc borrowers on
all analyzed time horizons, for Euro borrowers the eects are rather important for longer time
horizons.
19The results are robust to using earlier years. However, there is a trade-o: using earlier bank-rm connections
on the one hand reduces the likelihood of endogenous bank-rm relationships, but on the other hand increases
the probability of selection bias by eliminating rms younger than the chosen time lag.
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Table 6: Step 3 Estimated exchange rate eects
CHF EUR
1-year default probability 3.90pp 0.83pp
2-year default probability 6.24pp 2.73pp
3-year default probability 5.65pp 4.05pp
The table reports predicted excess default
probabilities that would be if foreign cur-
rency borrowers have borrowed in forint.
5 Conclusions
I decompose the factors contributing to the riskiness of foreign currency borrowers. I compare
counterfactual default probabilities of local and foreign currency borrowers estimated on disag-
gregated data. My results suggest that the currency mismatch with the depreciation of the local
currency is the most important factor contributing to the riskiness of foreign currency borrow-
ers, though boom-period excessive risk taking of banks is also concentrated in foreign currency
lending.
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6 Appendix
Table 7: Variable denitions
variable denition
Default equals 1 if the rms has loan with more than 90-day delinquency,
0 otherwise
Export sales ratios the export sales over the total sales of the rm
Foreign ownership equals 1 if ratio of foreign ownership of the rm is higher than
50%, 0 otherwise
Total assets the log of the total assets of the rm
Number of employees the log of number of employees of the rm
Age the log of one plus the age of the rm
Newcomer equals 1 if the rm established a new bank relationship in the
given year, 0 otherwise
Self-newcomer equals 1 if the rm established a new bank relationship not due
to acquisition in the given year, 0 otherwise
Acquired equals 1 if the rm was a client of the acquired bank, 0 otherwise
Capital ratio the ratio of own funds over total assets of the rm
Liquidity ratio the ratio of current assets over total assets of the rm
ROA the return on assets of the rm
Bank foreign ownership equals 1 if ratio of foreign ownership of the bank is higher than
50%, 0 otherwise
Bank total assets the log of the total assets of the bank
Bank doubtful loans the ratio of doubtful loans over the total loan portfolio of the bank
Bank capital ratio the ratio of own funds over total assets of the bank
Bank liquidity ratio the ratio of bank liquid assets over total assets of the bank
Bank ROA the total net income of the bank over the total asset of the bank
Bank CHF share the share of CHF in the credit portfolio of the bank
Bank EUR share the share of EUR in the credit portfolio of the bank
Stock variables are measured at the end of the year, ow variables are measured over year.
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Table 8: Ex-ante default probability models
Dependent Variable
1-year
default probability
2-year
default probability
3-year
default probability
Export sales ratio -0.007*** -0.005** -0.003
(-3.35) (-2.01) (-1.44)
Foreign ownership -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.009***
(-7.95) (-7.00) (-5.28)
Capital ratio -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.025***
(-27.09) (-22.26) (-14.57)
Liquidity ratio -0.002 0.003 0.007***
(-0.94) (1.52) (3.99)
Total assets 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001***
(8.75) (6.36) (3.15)
ROA -0.012*** -0.005*** -0.004***
(-8.67) (-4.08) (-2.61)
Number of employee -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.002***
(-9.79) (-6.11) (-4.01)
Age 0.001 -0.003*** -0.004***
(1.20) (-3.64) (-5.63)
Newcomer 0.003*** 0.017*** 0.022***
(3.42) (15.26) (19.68)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 126769 124125 117870
R-squared 0.016 0.015 0.015
The table reports estimates from linear probability regressions of rm characteristics on
default. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the rm becomes non-
performing on any of its loan within 1, 2 or 3 years. The denition of the variables can
be found in Table 7. T-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent that the coecient is signicantly dierent
from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9: Multinominal logit for the clients of the acquirer bank
Dependent Variable New loan denomination
HUF CHF EUR
Export sales ratio -0.005 -0.032** 0.036***
(-0.52) (-3.14) (12.50)
Foreign ownership -0.046 -0.041 0.087***
(-1.51) (-1.40) (6.95)
Capital ratio 0.043*** -0.029** -0.014*
(4.07) (-3.16) (-2.11)
Liquidity ratio 0.063*** -0.043*** -0.020***
(8.39) (-6.68) (-3.92)
Total assets -0.074*** -0.022 0.096***
(-5.37) (-1.86) (10.40)
ROA -0.022 0.035 -0.012
(-0.56) (1.40) (-0.31)
Number of employee 0.019* -0.006 -0.013*
(2.17) (-0.81) (-2.37)
Age -0.023* 0.007 0.016**
(-2.55) (0.92) (2.62)
Self-newcomer -0.079*** 0.030* 0.049***
(-5.63) (2.51) (5.14)
Acquired -0.064*** -0.014 0.078***
(-3.58) (-0.88) (6.74)
Sector dummies Yes
Observations 5365
Pseudo R-squared 0.134
The table reports estimates from multinominal logit regres-
sion of rm and bank characteristics on the choice of the
currency denomination of the loan for the clients of the ac-
quirer bank in the year subsequent to the acquisition. The
table presents marginal eects evaluated at the mean of all
explanatory variables showing the change in the probability
of observing each outcome resulted from a small change in a
covariate (a change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables), hold-
ing all other explanatory variables constant at their mean.
The denition of the variables can be found in Table 1. Z-
statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent that the
coecient is signicantly dierent from 1 at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 10: Multinominal logit for currency choice
Dependent Variable Outstanding loan denomination
HUF CHF EUR
Bank CHF share -0.324*** 0.178*** 0.146***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Bank EUR share -0.145*** -0.057*** 0.202***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Export sales ratio -0.008*** -0.026*** 0.034***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Foreign ownership 0.080*** -0.124*** 0.045***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Capital ratio 0.069*** -0.041*** -0.027***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Liquidity ratio 0.059*** -0.033*** -0.026***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Total assets -0.160*** 0.039*** 0.121***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ROA -0.044*** 0.055*** -0.011
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of employee 0.022*** -0.004 -0.018***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Age -0.013*** 0.005 0.008**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Newcommer -0.041*** 0.030*** 0.012***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Sector dummies Yes
Year FE Yes
Observations 119 511
Pseudo R-squared 0.157
The table reports estimates from multinominal logit regres-
sion of rm and bank characteristics on the choice of the
currency denomination of the loan for the clients of the ac-
quirer bank in the year subsequent to the acquisition. The
table presents marginal eects evaluated at the mean of all
explanatory variables showing the change in the probability
of observing each outcome resulted from a small change in a
covariate (a change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables), hold-
ing all other explanatory variables constant at their mean.
The denition of the variables can be found in Table 1. Z-
statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent that the
coecient is signicantly dierent from 1 at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 11: Eect of FX rate change
Dependent Variable 1-year 2-year 3-year
default probability default probability default probability
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
rmCHF 0.0175*** 0.0390** 0.0281*** 0.0624** 0.0347*** 0.0565*
(5.79) (2.99) (6.85) (3.15) (7.29) (2.16)
rmEUR 0.0097** 0.0083 0.0164*** 0.0273 0.0168** 0.0405*
(2.77) (0.93) (3.43) (1.81) (3.03) (2.07)
Export sales ratio -0.0053 0.0027 -0.0078 0.0007 -0.0125 -0.0131
(-1.08) (0.57) (-1.16) (0.1) (-1.61) (-1.36)
Foreign ownership -0.0057 -0.0003 -0.0067 -0.0058 -0.0101 -0.0202**
(-1.60) (-0.09) (-1.39) (-1.13) (-1.80) (-2.98)
Capital ratio -0.0317*** -0.0145*** -0.0526*** -0.0293*** -0.0675*** -0.0511***
(-10.19) (-4.61) (-12.49) (-6.38) (-13.79) (-8.69)
Liquidity ratio -0.0013 -0.0012 0.0023 0.0076 0.0076 0.0047
(-0.43) (-0.34) -0.54 (1.55) -1.56 (0.77)
Total assets 0.0002 0.0002 0.0012 0.0004 0.0019 0.0009
(0.25) (0.34) (1.17) (0.38) (1.56) (0.77)
ROA -0.0054*** -0.0033 -0.0034 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0025
(-4.04) (-1.57) (-1.91) (-1.20) (-1.24) (-1.06)
Number of employee -0.0031*** -0.0023** -0.0037** -0.0022 -0.0042** -0.0026
(-3.30) (-2.71) (-2.93) (-1.93) (-2.81) (-1.90)
Age -0.0024 -0.0016 -0.0054 -0.003 -0.0077* -0.0081*
(-1.09) (-0.86) (-1.79) (-1.09) (-2.21) (-2.51)
Observations 20073 20073 20073 20073 20073 20073
R-squared 0.013 0.016 0.019
The table presents the eect of FX rate change on default probabilities. Column (1) and (2) present
the rst stage regressions. The CHF and EUR indebtedness of the rms are instrumented by the share
of CHF and EUR loan in the portfolio of the bank related to the rm before the currency lending
boom. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent
that the coecient is signicantly dierent from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Figure 5: Databases
Note: The gure shows what databases are used and how they are matched.
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